During the last twenty years an increasing number of proposals to improve bank market discipline through the introduction of a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) have been presented and critically discussed by academic economists and bank regulators. While theoretical issues are key in this debate, a proper understanding of the market of banks subordinated notes and debentures (SND) and of the securities main features is also considered as relevant for the potential introduction, design and goals setting of such a policy. This paper builds on information concerning issuers, investors, markets and securities technical features to critically discuss these aspects. Data on over 1,800 European banks SND issues completed during the 1988-2000:Q1 period together with information on primary and secondary market functioning is presented. JEL Classification Numbers: G15, G21, G28
INTRODUCTION
Since the early eighties a large number of proposals to improve bank market discipline with the introduction of a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) have been drafted by prominent academic economists, members of regulatory agencies and other independent organizations 1 . These proposals have recently received more attention by bank regulators as these, in turn, are increasingly willing to share the burden of monitoring and controlling banks' risk taking activities with capital market investors.
A MSDP is generally viewed by those in favor of such a policy as an ideal instrument to improve both direct and indirect market discipline because of four main reasons. First, subordinated debt reduces the incentives for banks to engage in excessive risk taking activities. This is because subordinated notes and debentures (SND) investors have similar incentives to those of the deposit insurance agencies: if banks increase their risk taking activities and these turn out profitable, SND investors, unlike equity holders, do not benefit from these gains. If, on the other side, an increase in bank risk taking activities is followed by losses that exceed banks' equity capital, SND holders, unlike insured creditors, bear much of the cost. Direct market discipline would therefore be improved as banks' cost of funds would be more directly related to their risk profile.
Second, as a risk-sensitive form of funding, subordinated debt represents an ideal candidate to improve indirect market discipline. Indeed, issuance and secondary market spreads with respect to a corresponding Treasury security would provide bank supervisors with valuable information on banks risk profiles and would therefore make it more difficult for them to forbear when intervention is necessary.
Third, a MSDP would provide stronger incentives for banks to disclose more information on their portfolio risks in a timely manner to the public. This would in turn reinforce both direct and indirect market discipline.
Finally, because of their typical long maturity, SND represent a stable source of funds and limit the risk of bank "runs", thereby mitigating the possibility of systemic risks. This No attempt is made by this study to contribute to the debate concerning the ability of a MSDP to improve market discipline by empirically investigating the risk-sensitivity of SND spreads 2 or the ability of SND investors to influence banks management risk taking decisions 3 . Rather, the opportunity of a MSDP represents an underlying assumption of this study, the attention of which is entirely focused on the design of such a policy.
The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows three interesting results. First, the market for European banks' SND issues is a relatively concentrated one, with most of the supply coming from the largest banks. These institutions have significantly increased their SND issues since the introduction of the Capital Accord. They issue SND with an average frequency of twice a year and present an average ratio of outstanding subordinated debt to total assets slightly lower than 2%. Second, despite the wide variety of security structures, the large majority of European banks' SND issues are plain vanilla, ten year maturity, fixed interest rate, non-callable coupon bonds. Finally, while often listed in one or more European stock-exchanges for institutional investors needs, European banks SND are traded in a relatively illiquid secondary market, with few and infrequent large size transactions.
While the first two results are very similar to the ones observed for U.S. banks by the 1999 Federal Reserve Board Study Group on SND, some relevant differences between European and U.S. banks seem to exist as far as SND primary and secondary market functioning are concerned.
This empirical evidence has important policy implications for the evaluation of four main issues: (1) whether a MSDP should be mainly aimed at improving direct or indirect market discipline, (2) which banks should be subject to a MSDP, (3) the extent to which an internationally coordinated effort to harmonize the characteristics of an eventual MSDP is feasible, and (4) the "technical" design of a MSDP, with special reference to aspects such as minimum subordinated debt requirements, minimum frequency of issuance and security structures.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes the main features of European banks
SNDs issues since the introduction of the BIS Capital Accord in 1988 and provides information on the primary and secondary markets for such issues. Section 3 discusses the implications of this empirical evidence in terms of the design of a MSDP. Section 4 concludes. 
EUROPEAN BANKS SND ISSUES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Data sources
Issuers
European banks significantly increased the amount of their subordinated debt funding since the Basel Capital Accord became fully effective in 1992. and Spain led to a growing focus to shareholders value and, as a consequence, to an increasing attention on regulatory capital structure (tier 1 versus tier 2 capital). Indeed, the lowest 1999 average SD/TA ratios are the ones of French and German banks, a large number of which are still public. Second, European banks historically presented lower off-balance sheet activities than their U.S. counterparts. This is especially true for continental European banks and is in turn the consequence of the "banking oriented" -as opposed to "capital markets oriented" -nature of the European financial system. A lower development of investment banking activities such as securities underwriting and derivatives trading traditionally limited the growth of off-balance sheet assets for European banks. This in turn led to a lower ratio of risk-weighted assets (RWA) to total assets (TA). As shown by figure 3, in the mid-nineties this ratio was lower for continental European banks than for British, Irish, Japanese and U.S. ones. In a context where the SND issues are mostly driven by a regulatory rationale, this also led to a lower ratio of SD/TA. Following this argument, the recent increase in the RWA/TA for French, German, Italian and Spanish banks represents one of the reasons behind the growth in the SD/TA ratio. Indeed, this ratio remains lowest for French and German banks, which also experience a lower RWA/TA ratio.
As European banks get more and more involved in investments banking activities, the ratio RWA/TA tends to increase and
The large number of major French and German is is also reflected in the lower than average SND issue size of French and German banks compared to other European banks (Table 7) . A significant portion (26%) of the top 50 issuers of SND are public banks, i.e. banks which are either government owned or benefit from an explicit government guarantee.
These banks have a clear advantage in issuing SND because the government guarantee generally gives them a top notch credit rating, allowing them to raise funds at cheaper rates than private-sector competitors 9 .
The average ratio between subordinated debt and risk-weighted assets (RWA) for the top 50 issuers is 5.19%. This apparently contradicts the above-mentioned regulatory rationale behind the SND issuance decision. Indeed, a maximum 50% of total Tier 1 capital is allowed to be computed as BIS capital, the latter being generally lower than 10% of RWA. However, total subordinated debt outstanding also includes SND issues with a 7 Fiscal considerations are not considered a significant underlying factor of the decision to issue SND as these are again compared to senior debt and both type of funding interest rate expenses are tax-deductable. 8 The ranking is based on the dollar amount of SND issued during the 1988-2000:Q1. An alternative criterium based on the number of issues would have produced similar results. 9 See Sironi (2000) for a quantification of this interest rate subsidy.
residual maturity of less than five years, which would only count as tier 2 capital for a limited portion of their total face value 10 .
The average frequency of issue for the top 50 issuers is twice a year, ranging from a maximum of four times for the largest banks to a minimum of 0.5 (one issue every two years) for the smallest ones.
2.3.Investors
Demand for European banks' SND comes both from retail and institutional investors.
European banks raise subordinated debt in two main ways: (1) through their own distribution networks with private placements mainly targeted at private retail clients, and (2) through public issues targeted to institutional investors such as insurance companies, mutual and pension funds. The latter are generally larger size eurobond issues, underwritten and managed by large syndicates of international investment banks and listed in stock exchanges such as London and Luxembourg. Institutional investors also play a key role in secondary market transactions (see paragraph 2.6).
Securities
Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 provide detailed information on the 1,803 SND issues. The characteristics of the average European bank subordinated debt issue are similar to the one issued by US bank holding companies (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999): a fixed rate, non-callable coupon bond with an average maturity of ten years and an average size of US$ 240 million 11 . Indeed, the large majority of the 1988-2000 issues are fixed-rate (74%), with only a small portion of them being zero-coupon (1.6%), convertible into floating rate (0.8%) or including warrants for equity or senior debt (0.5%). The remaining 26% of the issues are mostly represented by floating rate notes (24.8%) and convertibles (0.8%).
The average maturity of European banks' SND issues is 10.1 years, with 10 years representing the mode value not only for the whole sample but also for all but one country (Norway) and all years since 1992, when the Basel Capital Accord became effective. While SND with a maturity ranging from 2 to 100 years have been issued by European banks, the typical maturity ranges from 5 to 15 years ( Figure 1 ). This is mostly driven by the Basel Capital Accord rules, requiring subordinated debt to be amortized on a straight line basis over the five years preceding the maturity in order to qualify as tier 2 capital (Table 1) . Indeed, figure 2 shows that the maturity distribution of European banks' SND issues changed since the Basel Capital Accord came into effect (end 1992), with a significant increase in the number of issues with a maturity equal and in excess of 10 years. More recently, following the 1997 introduction of tier 3 capital, which allowed SND issues with maturity above 2 years to qualify as regulatory capital for market risk requirements purposes, shorter maturity SND have been issued by major European banks.
Over 50% of the SND issues with a maturity of less than 5 years have been completed in the 1997-2000:Q1 period 12 .
Perpetual and callable issues represent 12.4% and 17.4% of the total SND issues respectively. A wide range of SND types are issued by European banks (collared, dual currency, reverse floaters, index-linked, etc.). However, these "irregular" securities only account for 15% of the total SND issues, the large majority (85%) being represented by "plain vanilla" issues. An analysis by year of issue (Table 6) On the other side, the increasing rate scenario of the late nineties favored these kinds of issues.
Finally, a breakdown by currency of denomination (Table 7) shows three interesting points. First, Luxembourg franc is the most commonly used currency, accounting for over 25% of the total issues. These are mostly plain vanilla, fixed-rate, small size eurobonds, a significant portion (61%) of which are then listed in the Luxembourg stock exchange for institutional investors needs. Second, most of the perpetual and callable SND issues are either U.S. dollar or pound sterling denominated issues, suggesting that U.S. and U.K. investors have an appetite for such issues while continental European investors prefer plain vanilla issues. Finally, Euro denominated issues, while accounting for only 15% of the total 1,803 SND issues completed by European banks in the 1988-2000:Q1 period, represent the majority of more recent issues (over 75% of the 1999-2000:Q1 issues). Table 9 reports data on European banks SND issues by primary market type. Private placement issues, accounting for almost a third of the total number of SND issues, represent only 10.6% of their total U.S.$ 252 billion face value. Their average size is significantly lower than the one of public issues. A large majority of the latter is represented by eurobond issues. These account for over 60% of the total number of SND issues and for over 64% of the total dollar value. The remaining 35% of the SND issues are divided between domestic ones (21%), foreign ones (17%) and global bonds (1%).
The primary market
Global bonds represent very large size issues, with an average face value of over 600 million U.S. dollars, similar to eurobonds in that they are offered for sale in many countries simultaneously but different from them in that they are registered securities held in common depositories such as Cedel or Euroclear. This enhance secondary market trading in local markets and between investors in different regions.
The secondary market
According to interviewed market participants 13 , the secondary market for European banks SND issues is an over the counter dealer market dominated by large banks and institutional investors. Indeed, while most of the SND issues are listed in at least one exchange for institutional investors' needs 14 , few transactions take place in such exchanges.
It is a relatively illiquid over the counter market, with few and infrequent large size Investors in the secondary market of European banks' SND are mostly insurance companies, investment funds, pension funds and banks' asset management divisions.
According to interviewed market participants, banks do not directly invest in other banks SND because of the capital adequacy rule requiring a bank to deduct the amount of these investments from its regulatory capital.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DESIGN OF A MANDATORY SUBORDINATED DEBT POLICY
Proposals to introduce a MSDP range from soft ones, aimed at complementing capital requirements, to more "radical" ones, aimed at replacing capital regulation. The latter generally focus on direct market discipline, the process whereby the expected cost of a bank funds is a direct function of its risk profile. On the other side, the "soft" proposals focus more on indirect market discipline. This can be defined as the process whereby the yields of a bank's risk-sensitive source of funds are used as a means for bank supervisors to improve their risk monitoring and controlling tasks. Proposals of this type range from more "discretionary" ones, where secondary market spreads of SND would be used by bank supervisors as market signals of the issuing banks' risk, to more "rigorous" ones, where changes in secondary market spreads would trigger regulatory actions such as prompt corrective actions (PCA).
16 Two interviewed market participants report bid-offer spreads in price terms, of approximately 30 to 60 cents. This is equivalent to an interest rate based spread of 4 to 8 basis points for a ten year fixed rate SND issue with a 5% annual coupon. 17 Liquidity crisis, default of comparable bonds and rating downgrades of similar issuers are generally mentioned by interviewed market participants as examples of these events. 18 One interviewee indicated that an exception to this rule is represented by grey market quotes published by lead banks of syndicated issues for subordinated eurobonds.
The 1999 Federal Reserve Study Group on SND carefully reviews the main proposals and classifies them into "three generations" 19 . First generation proposals were mostly made during the mid-eighties and were aimed at reinforcing direct market discipline by increasing a bank's cost of funding rather than by affecting its ability to obtain funds 20 .
As such, they generally required banks to issue SND frequently, in order to keep their cost of capital in line with their evolving risk profile.
Second generation proposals were made during the late eighties and early nineties 21 .
While still focused on the direct market discipline effect of subordinated debt, they emphasized the impact of a bank's risk profile on its ability to issue SND rather than on its cost of funding. Under these proposals, banks would be required to issue SND either on a frequent basis or with a provision allowing investors to put the debt back to the issuing bank. The inability of a bank to issue SND would then be used both as a signal of its financial weakness and as a trigger for regulatory action.
Third generation proposals are identified with the ones drafted by Calomiris in the late nineties (1997 and 1999) . These proposals would require banks to issue on a very frequent basis (monthly rollover) short term SND (two years maturity) with a cap on the rate that they would be allowed to pay. Banks that do not manage to issue at rates under the rate cap would be required to gradually reduce their assets. As with previous proposals, the focus is on direct market discipline imposed in the issuance market.
More recent proposals presented by both the U.S. and European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees 22 , while not providing details concerning technical aspects such as SND security structures and frequency of issuance, emphasized the role of subordinated debt as a means of reinforcing indirect market discipline and reducing bank supervisors' discretion in bank crisis management policies. Under this type of proposals, the distinction between tier 1 and tier 2 capital would be eliminated and banks would be subject to a simple leverage ratio that could be satisfied by both equity capital and subordinated debt.
Direct or indirect market discipline?
In order to adequately design the technical features of a MSDP, a clear understanding of the main goal of such a policy is needed. This might appear as a trivial statement as no one would doubt that the basic goal of a MSDP is to improve bank market discipline.
However, some key elements of a MSDP are affected by the choice between a direct market discipline oriented policy and an indirect market discipline oriented one. Direct market discipline to be effective requires a bank's expected cost of funds to be a direct function of its risk profile. This in turn requires that: (1) a significant portion of the bank's funding is in the form of uninsured risk-sensitive liabilities 23 , and (2) the bank access the debt market frequently enough for its borrowing costs to adequately reflect its evolving risk profile. Condition (1) requires that no conjectural guarantees such as "too big to fail" ones are perceived by subordinated investors to be in place. Indeed, this represent a necessary condition for a MSDP to be effective. While this issue is not explicitly treated by this paper, it is worth noting that currently available empirical research (Sironi, 2000) concluded that TPTF policies were present in the European banking industry in the first half of the nineties and became weaker or vanished during the second part of the decade. A much stronger and significant impact was found for explicit government guarantees such as the ones enjoyed by the German Landesbank.
These explicit guarantees led to a significant government subsidy in the form of a lower cost of SND issues, the value of which has been increasing over the nineties.
In addition to that, no standardization of the SND securities would be needed for direct market discipline purposes. Both fixed rate and floating rate SND would serve the purpose of reinforcing direct market discipline, just as different maturity SND would.
On the other side, indirect market discipline requires the yield of SND to be both easily observable and comparable between different issuing banks. Secondary market spreads are therefore more relevant and their relationship to the evolving risk profiles of the issuing bank is crucial for its effectiveness. A portion of a bank's funds should be in the form of a risk-sensitive financial instrument traded in a liquid secondary market. In order to allow the supervisory authorities to make reasonable comparisons between the spreads of different banks SND, a high degree of standardization in the securities characteristics would be preferable, as this would also magnify secondary market liquidity. No significant amount or high frequency of issuance of SND is needed for the purpose of indirect market discipline 24 .
In light of the scarce liquidity of European banks SND secondary market, a MSDP mainly aimed at reinforcing direct market discipline would be advisable. However, the use of issuance spreads by bank supervisors as market signals of a bank financial soundness, without any automatic link to PCA type regulatory actions, could also be beneficial, introducing an indirect market discipline goal in the design of a MSDP 25 .
Which banks?
Most of the proposals to introduce a MSDP suggest that only large banks should be subject to such a policy. Indeed, SND are currently issued mostly, although not exclusively, by large banks with total assets in excess of U.S. $ 50 billion. These banks account for over 83% of the total U.S.$ 252 billion of SND issued by European banks during 1988-2000:Q1. This is not a sufficient condition for a MSDP to be limited to major banks. However, three additional arguments can be advanced. First, for a MSDP to be effective in improving direct market discipline, a minimum frequency of issue is required. If a bank issue subordinated debt only once every two year, its cost of funding would not adequately reflect the evolution of its risk profile. Table 4 shows that the frequency of issue is decreasing with the size of the issuing bank.
Second, for a MSDP to be effective in improving indirect market discipline, a minimum amount is required for each SND issue. Market participants report that the secondary market liquidity of an SND issue is a direct function of the issue amount and of the issuing bank size and "name". 24 An exception would arise if the secondary market liquidity of an individual issue is partly driven by how long it has been outstanding. In such a case, a higher frequency of issue would enhance indirect market discipline. However, I am not aware of any study providing empirical evidence on this relationship. 25 Interviewed market participants tend to be skeptical about the reliability of secondary market spreads as signals of the issuing banks' risk profiles for two main reasons. First, because, given the illiquidity of the market, spreads can be significantly affected by the decision to buy or sell of individual institutional investors. These could in turn be driven by reasons that are not directly related to the credit quality of the issuing bank, such as cash withdrawals for an investment fund. Second, because secondary market SND Finally, the need to improve both types of market discipline would be particularly strong for those banks that choose to adopt an internal model approach (IMA) to capital requirements. A future capital adequacy regime based on banks' internal risk measurement models poses a major problem for bank supervisors. Given the shareholders' option-like payoff profile, banks experiencing significant unexpected losses and getting closer to their default point could find it convenient to adopt a gaming behavior by artificially reducing the internally produced risk measures while increasing their risk taking activities in an effort to replenish their equity capital. The growing independence of bank management in determining their capital adequacy must therefore be accompanied by an increasing role of market forces in monitoring banks' risk profiles.
Both the U.S. and the European experience following the Basel 1996 Amendment to the
Capital Accord 26 show that the largest banks are the most likely ones to choose this approach. Because of these reasons, a MSDP limited to those banks that choose an IMA, either in the form of an internal ratings based approach (IRA) to credit risk capital requirements or in the form of a IMA to market risk capital requirements, is considered appropriate. This solution could also represent a "transition period" during which no real obligation to satisfy a subordinated debt requirement would be in place, as banks would only face it in the event they choose for a IMA to capital standards.
How much?
Defining the amount of the appropriate required cushion of a MSDP requires to identify the relevant variable to which the subordinated debt requirement should be related. Most of the MSDP proposals drafted during the eighties, before the introduction of the 1988
Basel Capital Accord, were based either on bank liabilities or on bank deposits as the relevant variable 27 . On the other side, most of the proposals advanced during the nineties are based either on total risky (non-reserve) assets or risk-weighted assets (RWA) 28 . This evolution reflects both the belief that the required cushion should be directly related to a spreads are considered to be driven more by short term market expectations than by the medium to long term "fundamentals" of the issuing banks. 26 This amendment introduced the IMA alternative for market risk capital requirements purposes. 27 Most of these proposals would require a minimum subordinated debt requirement ranging from 2% to 4% of total deposits or liabilities. 28 Most of these proposals would require a minimum subordinated debt requirement ranging from 2% to 5% of risky or risk-weighted assets.
bank's risk profile, and the idea that a MSDP should complement the existing capital adequacy framework and, as such, be based on the same relevant variable. opportunities. This problem would be less relevant than it currently is because of the lower cost of subordinated debt capital compared to equity capital.
An alternative to a minimum ratio of RWA would be a MSDP based on a minimum portion of a bank total capital at risk, as measured by an IMA. This alternative has two main advantages. First, it would not confine the subordinated debt requirement to credit risk, by taking into consideration other types of risks, most notably market risks. Second, it would provide a subordinated debt requirement which is better related to a bank global portfolio risk than the one resulting from the sum of single assets risk-weighted requirements. On the other side, this alternative suffers from the moral hazard problem outlined above. MSDP is especially needed as a means to counterweight the trend towards a greater reliance on banks internal models based equity capital requirements because of the potential risk of "gaming" behavior on the part of these banks. 29 The U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000) claims that using a simple leverage ratio based on total assets would be equivalent, if not better, than a RWA related one because of its simplicity. This argument fails to consider that a simple leverage ratio is equivalent to attributing an identical 100% risk weight to all assets, thereby imposing the same capital charge to a AAA rated government bond and an unsecured loan to a CCC rated company. While a standardized and static differentiation of asset classes would never completely eliminate regulatory arbitrage opportunities, it is clear that these opportunities are lower the higher is the number of the risk buckets and the more refined is the risk-weighting scheme. 30 This in turn could be obtained in two alternative ways: (1) by multiplying the standard approach market risk capital requirement by 12.5 (the reciprocal of 8%), or (2) by adding the exposure of each single market risk factor such as the net open position in foreign currencies and the net open position in stocks for general equity risk.
In light of the above arguments, a MSDP based on a bank RWA related requirement is considered, on balance, a better alternative. Table 4 reports the ratio of total outstanding subordinated debt to RWA for the 50 major European bank issuers of subordinated debt.
This typically ranges from a minimum of 2% to a maximum of 8%. This suggests that a minimum subordinated debt requirement of 3% to 4% of RWA, while forcing a minority of banks to increase their SND outstanding, would not significantly affect major
European banks financial structure.
The Federal Reserve Board Study Group on SND suggests that a lower rate would be more appropriate 31 . This conclusion is based on two main arguments. First, given the current ratio of subordinated debt to RWA, an SND requirement in excess of 2 percent would have significant effects on the balance sheets of some banking organizations.
Second, given many institutions preference for tier 1 over tier 2 capital, a high subordinated debt requirement could provide an incentive to substitute SND for equity capital, thereby weakening their overall capital structure.
A reply to these arguments could be based on the following three considerations. First, the total amount of a bank outstanding SND would qualify for subordinated debt requirement purposes, without any residual maturity restriction such as the five years one currently in place. This would make it easier for banks to comply. Second, once a MSDP is introduced for those banks opting for an IMA to capital requirement, the latter would most likely be based on equity, or tier 1, capital only. This in turn would reduce the risk of equity capital being substituted by subordinated debt. Finally, if the improvement of direct market discipline represents the main goal of a MSDP, then a significant amount of subordinated debt is needed for a bank's cost of funding to be affected. Table 4 reports the average frequency of issue for the top 50 European bank issuers of SND. This ranges from a minimum of 0.5 (one issue every two years) for the smallest banks to a maximum of 4 to 5 times a year for the largest banks. However, these results are based on the 1988-2000 averages. As such, they include data from the late eighties and early nineties, when SND issues were less common and frequent for European banks (see Table 6 ). This evidence suggests that imposing a minimum frequency of issuance of twice a year, while forcing a minority of large banks to issue SND more frequently than they currently do, would not significantly affect major European banks' practices. This is especially true if the introduction of a MSDP is limited to those banks that opt for an IMA to capital requirements, typically the largest banks.
How frequently?
Requiring a higher frequency of issuance, such as three or four times a year, would probably be beneficial as a means of reinforcing both direct market discipline and "issuance spreads based" indirect market discipline. On the other side, it could significantly increase banks' borrowing costs by forcing them to issue SND during periods of adverse capital markets conditions.
One additional argument against a high frequency of issuance requirement is based on the increase in banks' borrowing costs that would result as a consequence of lower average SND issues size 32 . Empirical evidence based on European banks SND issues completed during the 1991-2000:Q1 period does not support this argument. Indeed, the size of SND issues is not statistically significant in explaining the variability of primary market SND spreads with respect to a corresponding Treasury security 33 . One could reply that the size of an SND issue could affect an SND issue secondary market spread. However, the issuing bank's borrowing cost is more directly related to the primary market spread.
What type of SND?
Finally, a MSDP could impose restrictions on the type of securities that qualify as subordinated debt. These restrictions could refer to elements such as maturity, interest rate type, call or put options, or special covenants. While reducing the flexibility of bank management decisions, such restrictions could reinforce both direct market discipline, by increasing SND investors incentives to monitor and control the issuing banks' risk taking activity, and indirect market discipline, by improving the comparability of SND spreads across banks and over time.
The cost-benefit analysis of such restrictions should therefore be based not only on their theoretical advantages from a market discipline point of view, but also on their impact on banks' prevailing practices. As far as the latter is concerned, the relatively high 
How would the capital adequacy framework be affected by a MSDP?
One final issue that must be evaluated when considering the introduction of a MSDP is the one related to the implications of such a policy for the current capital adequacy framework and, most notably, for the definition of capital. Subordinated debt currently qualifies, together with undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general loan loss reserves and other hybrid debt capital instruments, as tier 2 capital. It also represents the only source of tier 3 capital (Table 1) .
It is reasonable to assume that the introduction of a MSDP would eliminate the possibility for banks to rely on subordinated debt as a component of regulatory capital. This is considered, together with other changes in the definition of regulatory capital, especially appropriate for those banks that opt for an IMA to capital requirements. Indeed, much of the efforts to reform the capital adequacy framework are aimed at narrowing the gap between the way the banking industry and regulators measure the amount of capital a bank needs or, alternatively, its economic capital at risk. These efforts, in turn, are considered both as a means of improving the quantification of the amount of risk taken by banks, and as a way of reducing regulatory arbitrage incentives.
A bank economic capital at risk is generally defined by industry practitioners as the total unexpected loss a bank can suffer during a pre-defined time horizon -generally one year -with a pre-determined confidence level. A bank with a total economic capital at risk of U.S.$ 1 billion computed using a one year time horizon and a 99.9% confidence level should have a 0.1% probability of experiencing an unexpected loss in excess of that amount in the following year. 33 See Sironi (2000) . 34 While most European banks' SND issues are fixed rate bonds, imposing a restriction on this element would seriously limit banks flexibility and, at the same time, not significantly increase spreads comparability.
A key aspect of this definition of a bank's economic capital at risk is that it restricts the role of capital reserves to the unexpected component of the bank's total future losses, the expected component being covered by other types of reserves, such as loan loss reserves for credit risk. This distinction is crucial for the definition of the amount of capital a banking organization has available. Indeed, once an IMA is made available to the banking industry as an alternative to standardized capital requirements, then a similar logic as the one underlying internal risk measurement models should apply to the definition of capital. This would in turn require to restrict the regulatory definition of capital to tier 1.
CONCLUSIONS
This study has attempted to describe the main characteristics of European banks' SND issues, to examine the functioning of both the primary and secondary markets of these securities, and to critically discuss the implications of this empirical evidence for the design of a MSDP. No attempt has been made to provide empirical evidence to support the benefits of such a policy. Rather, the opportunity of a MSDP has been taken for granted by this study, the attention of which has been entirely focused on the design of such a policy.
Three main conclusions stand out from our analysis. First, the market for European banks' SND issues is a relatively concentrated one, with most of the supply coming from the largest banks. These institutions have significantly increased their SND issues since the introduction of the Capital Accord. They issue SND with an average frequency of twice a year and present an average ratio of outstanding subordinated debt to total assets slightly lower than 2%. Second, despite the wide variety of security structures, the large majority of European banks' SND issues are plain vanilla, ten year maturity, fixed interest rate, non-callable coupon bonds. These characteristics are similar to the ones found by the 1999 Federal Reserve Study Group on SND for U.S. banks 35 . Third, while often listed in one or more European stock-exchanges for institutional investors needs, European banks SND are traded in a relatively illiquid secondary market, with few and infrequent large size transactions.
35 Table 13 provides a comparison between European and U.S. banks' issues of SND.
These conclusions have important implications for the design of a MSDP. First, the introduction of such a policy should be limited to the largest banks. The possibility of restricting the subordinated debt requirement to those banks that opt for an IMA to capital standards, rather than to banks with a minimum size, could represent an ideal way of achieving this objective. This would also allow a transition period without any real obligation for banks, during which bank supervisors could evaluate the impact and implications of such a policy.
Second, a MSDP should be mainly aimed at improving direct rather than indirect market discipline. As such, it should be based on a relatively high subordinated debt requirement, accompanied by a minimum frequency of issuance requirement.
Finally, given the many similarities between major European and U.S. banks' SND issuance practices and security structures, an internationally coordinated effort to harmonize the characteristics of a MSDP is considered both feasible and important.
Indeed, most of the recent work to improve bank capital regulation has been carried out with an international focus through the Basel Committee. This is because of two main reasons. First, independent national regulations are considered increasingly incompatible with the global nature of the activities of major banks, to which most of the recent and currently undergoing efforts to reform the capital adequacy framework are addressed.
Second, any independent attempt by single national authorities to modify the existing capital adequacy framework would inevitably affect the relative competitiveness of large international banks, thereby violating the "level the playing field" principle. Both these arguments apply to the eventual introduction of a MSDP. General funds/reserves must meet the following criteria: 1) allocations must be made out of post-tax retained earnings or out of pre-tax earnings adjusted for all potential liabilities, 2) funds and movements into or out of them must be disclosed separately in the banks accounts, 3) the funds must be available to a bank to meet losses for unrestricted and immediate use as soon as they occur, 4) losses cannot be charged directly to the funds but must be taken through the P&L account
UPPER TIER 2
Maximum 100 percent of tier 1 capital Undisclosed Reserves 1) Passed through the profit and loss account. 2) Not encumbered by any provision or other known liability. 3) Freely and immediately available to meet unforeseen future losses. 4) Accepted by the bank's supervisory authorities.
Asset Revaluation Reserves
Asset revaluation reserves that take the form of latent gains on unrealised securities are subject to a discount of 55% on the difference between historic book value and market value. General provisions/general loan-loss reserves
Only if held against presently unidentified losses. Where they include amounts reflecting lower valuations of asset or latent but unidentified losses present in the balance-sheet, the amount of such provisions or reserves will be limited to 1.25 percent points of weighted risk assets Hybrid debt capital instruments (cumulative preference shares, perpetual subordinated debt) 1) Unsecured, subordinated and fully paid-up. 2) Not redeemable at the initiative of the holder or without the prior consent of the supervisory authority. 3) Available to participate in losses without the bank being obliged to cease trading. 4) Must allow service obligations to be deferred where the profitability of the bank would not support payment.
LOWER TIER 2
Subordinated term debt
Minimum original term to maturity of over five years. Subject to amortization (20 percent discount every year if maturity less than five years).
Maximum 50 percent of tier 1 capital
TIER 3
Subordinated term debt 1) Can only be used to cover market risk capital requirement from the trading book. 2) Minimum original maturity of over two years. 3) Must contain interest payments and principal repayment deferral provisions, which can be exercised if the minimum capital adequacy ratio is breached. 
